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Abstract
The immigration laws of the United States have long recognized a policy against deporting
a person who seeks refuge in the United States, when it appears that person would be subject to
persecution following deportation. The Immigration Act of 1952 permitted the Immigration and
Naturalization Service to withhold the deportation of any person who could show that he would
suffer persecution in the nation to which he would be deported. A similar provision is contained
in the UN Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. The INS and the courts, having ruled that
“no real conflict” existed between the Protocol and the Immigration Act, continued to adhere to to
the latter without ever examining the significance of fundamental discrepancies.

PERSECUTION ABROAD AS GROUNDS FOR
WITHHOLDING DEPORTATION: THE STANDARD OF
PROOF AND THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
INTRODUCTION
The immigration laws of the United States have long recognized a policy against deporting a person who seeks refuge in the
United States, when it appears that the person would be subject to
persecution following deportation.' The Immigration and Nationality Act of 19522 (Immigration Act) permitted the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) to withhold the deportation of
any person who could show that he would suffer persecution in the
nation to which he would be deported. A similar provision was
contained in the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees 4 (Protocol), which the United States adopted in 1968.
Under the Protocol, contracting states are forbidden to return persons to countries where they would be subject to persecution. 5
The Protocol and the Immigration Act differed in at least two
significant respects. The Protocol's provision was mandatory, entitling the applicant to relief upon an appropriate showing of eligibility.6 By contrast, the Immigration Act made relief discretionary,
1. The first provision of the immigration laws of the United States on this subject was
included in the Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 23, 64 Stat. 987, 1010 which
forbade the Attorney General to deport any alien to a country where the Attorney General
determined that such alien would be subject to physical persecution. Id. The Immigration
and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952), amended this
section, authorizing but not requiring that the deportation of any alien be withheld when, in
the opinion of the Attorney General, the alien would be subject to physical persecution. Id.
In 1965, Congress liberalized the section's definition of persecution by deleting "physical
persecution" and inserting "persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion."
Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 11(0, 79 Stat. 911, 918. Finally, Congress
amended the section in 1978 to disallow withholding of deportation of aliens who aided in the
Nazi persecution. Act of Oct. 30, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-549, § 104, 92 Stat. 2065, 2066. The
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.), substantially changes this section. See infra notes 87-112 and accompanying text.
2. Pub. L. No. 89-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503
(1976)).
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. III 1979). See infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
4. Opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6225, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606
U.N.T.S. 268 [hereinafter cited as Protocol].
5. Id. art. 33, § 1.
6. Article 33 of the Protocol embodied the principle of non-refoulement, an obligation
to refrain from returning an alien within its borders to a country where he would be subject
to persecution. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. Thus, the claimant had a right
to protection under article 33 provided he could show that he was eligible for relief.
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authorizing but not requiring that deportation be withheld upon
the demonstration of statutory eligibility. 7 The legal standards governing eligibility were also significantly different. The strict evidentiary standards necessary to establish eligibility under the Immigration Act resulted in the failure of many claims. 8 The Protocol's more
lenient standards made eligibility more readily attainable.
Before the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980, 1 these discrepancies and their implications were ignored. The INS and the
courts, having ruled that "no real conflict" existed between the
Protocol and the Immigration Act, continued to adhere to the latter
without ever examining the significance of these fundamental discrepancies.1 0
The Refugee Act makes relief mandatory upon a showing of
eligibility as required by the Protocol.'1 Moreover, the courts have
thus far interpreted the statutory change as requiring the judiciary
to ensure the observance of correct legal standards under the Refugee Act. 1 2 A consequence of the courts' utilization of their increased
authority has been to conform the legal standard employed under
the immigration laws with that of the Protocol. The courts have
made it clear that they will now have the final word in interpreting
the provisions of the immigration laws relating to withholding of
deportation. The exercise of this increased authority has resolved
the conflict between the international obligations of the United
States under the Protocol and the immigration laws of the United
States. In order to understand fully the legal standards presently
applied in withholding of deportation cases, it is necessary to examine the substance as well as the policies underlying the standards
found within the immigration laws and the Protocol.

7. The "favorable exercise of relief [in 243(h) cases] is manifestly not a matter of right
under any circumstances, but rather is in all cases a matter of grace. The very wording of the
law provides freedom of decision, to wit: the possibility of denial on purely discretionary
grounds." Sihasale, 11 1. & N. Dec. 531, 532 (1966).
8. E.g., Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564, 568 (1967) (claim denied on basis of policy restricting
favorable exercise of discretion to cases of clear probability of persecution of the particular
individual claimant).
9. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
10. See infra notes 69-86 and accompanying text.
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. IV 1980).
12. See infra notes 87-110 and accompanying text.
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I. WITHHOLDING OF DEPORTATION
UNDER THE IMMIGRATION ACT
Section 243(h) of the Immigration Act 13 authorized the Attorney General 14 to withhold the deportation 15 of any alien within the
United States16 when, in his opinion, the alien would be subject to
persecution 17 in the country to which he was being deported. Under
section 243(h), the withholding of deportation was within the discretion of the INS.1 8 Upon a determination of statutory eligibility,
this section authorized, but did not require that deportation be
withheld. 19
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. III 1979), amended by 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp IV
1980). Section 1253(h) read:
The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any
alien . . . within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien
would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion and
for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason.
Id.
14. Without divesting himself of any of his powers, privileges or duties under the
immigration and naturalization laws, the Attorney General has delegated his authority to the
Commissioner of the INS to direct the INS and to enforce all laws relating to immigration
and naturalization of aliens. 8 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1982). The Commissioner of the INS has the
power to redelegate his authority to any other officer or employee of the INS. Id.
15. Aliens who have entered the United States are subject to expulsion from the country
if they are determined to be within one of the classes of deportable aliens set forth in the
Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. IV 1980). All deportation determinations are made at a deportation hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 242.8 (1982). A special inquiry officer,
also termed an immigration judge, has the authority to determine deportability. 8 C.F.R. §
242.8 (1982). The INS is required to establish deportability by "clear, unequivocal and
convincing evidence." 8 C.F.R. § 242.14 (1982).
16. Under the Immigration Act, only deportable aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1251
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980) were within the United States for the purposes of § 243(h). The
classes of excludable aliens enumerated in 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) are made
the subject of exclusion proceedings in order to determine whether they "shall be allowed to
enter or shall be excluded and deported." 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1976).
Although certain classes of excludable aliens were, by definition, physically present in
the United States, they were not "within the United States" for the purposes of § 243(h), and
could therefore not raise such a claim. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958);
Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); United States v. Kavazanjian, 623 F.2d 730 (1st
Cir. 1980); Yuen Sang Low v. United States, 479 F.2d 820 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1039 (1973).
17. Persecution has been defined as "the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who
differ (in race, religion, or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive." Kovac v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969).
18. In Kasravi v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968), the
court stated: "Congress . . . by the express wording of . . . [§ 243(h)] . . . [has] . . . left to
the broad discretion of the Attorney General the authority to suspend deportation in such
cases and the questions of both eligibility and merit . . . are part and parcel of this adminstrative determination." Id. at 677 (footnote omitted).
19. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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A. Burden of Proof
Under section 243(h) the applicant had the burden of present2 0
ing evidence demonstrating a "clear probability of persecution."
Sustaining this burden was difficult because the person making a
243(h) claim was in a foreign land with little or no access to
evidence or witnesses in his home country. In many cases the only
evidence available to support the claimant's allegations was his own
unsubstantiated testimony, 2' which was not sufficient to meet the
burden under the clear probability standard. 22 Furthermore, this
standard required that, to be probative, any corroborating evidence show that the particular claimant would be subject to persecution. 23 The evidence available to support claims of persecution,
however, was generally limited to documents in the nature of
newspaper and magazine articles depicting political conditions in
24
the country from which the applicant had fled.
The requirement that corroborating evidence relate specifically to the claimant diluted the value of evidence tending to show

20. E.g., Kashani v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 547 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir.
1977); Cisternas-Estay v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 531 F.2d 155, 159 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976); Rosa v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 440 F.2d
100, 102 (1st Cir. 1971); Cheng Kai Fu v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 386 F.2d 750,
753 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968); Lena v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 379 F.2d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 1967); Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 319-20 (1973);
Joseph, 13 I. & N. Dec. 70, 72 (1968); Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564, 568 (1967).
21. See Sihasale 111. & N. Dec. 759, 762 (1966); Weis, The Concept of the Refugee in
InternationalLaw, 87 JOURNAL DO DnOiT INTERNATIONAL 928, 986-88 (1960).
22. See, e.g., Moghanian v. United States Dep't of Justice, 577 F.2d 141, 142 (9th Cir.
1978); Kashani v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 547 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1977);
Rosa v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1971). See also
McMullen, 17 I. & N. Dec. 542, 547 (1980) (claimant's own testimony not sufficient to show
that the government has any present interest in persecuting him).
23. In Fleurinor v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 585 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1978),
the court rejected a claim that an Amnesty International report depicting conditions in Haiti
was relevant to a 243(h) claim. In making such a determination, the court noted that "in
order for evidence to be 'material' . . . the evidence must be probative on the issue of the
likelihood of this alien being subject to persecution in the event of deportation." Id. at 133.
See also Lena v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 379 F.2d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 1967)
(evidence must show a clear probability of persecution of the "particular individual" applicant); Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564, 570 (1967) (mere fact that the claimant was a member of an
ethnic group that was subject to persecution in Indonesia not sufficient in the absence of
"convincing evidence" that the claimant would be singled out for persecution). Cf. Coriolan
v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 559 F.2d 993, 1002 (5th Cir. 1977) (immigration
authorities could not properly decide an alien's fate without taking into account conditions in
the alien's country).
24. See, e.g., McMullen, 17 I. & N. Dec. 542 (1980).
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that circumstances existed in the home country which exposed the
claimant to a risk of persecution. Such evidence, although admissible, was given little weight. For example, an applicant's proof of
his home government's indiscriminate and widespread persecution
of a particular group, regardless of the claimant's association with
that group, was not sufficient without a specific showing that he

would be singled out for such persecution.2 5 Likewise, a person was
not entitled to relief on the mere claim that he had been persecuted

in the past and that similar circumstances presently existed in his
homeland which created the risk of further persecution. Only specific evidence demonstrating that the claimant would presently be
subject to persecution was sufficient under the clear probability
standard. 26
B. Judicial Review of INS Decisions Made Under Section 243(h)

Claimants under section 243(h) had the right to appeal INS
decisions to the United States Courts of Appeals. 27 However, the
appellate courts regarded the scope of their review in 243(h) cases
as extremely limited.28 The courts were permitted to review administrative determinations to ensure that the applicant had a reason-

25. See, e.g., Fleurinor v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 585 F.2d 129, 133-34
(5th Cir. 1978); Kasravi v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 400 F.2d 675, 676 (9th Cir.
1968).
26. See Fleurinor, 585 F.2d at 133.
27. A decision of the special inquiry officer concerning deportability may be appealed to
the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board). 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b)(2) (1982). The Board's appellate jurisdiction is set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1982). With certain limited exceptions,
decisions of the Board are "final." 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(2). Final decisions of the Board are
appealable to the Courts of Appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1976).
28. In Kasravi v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968), the
court stated:
By finding that the petitioner is not "statutory eligible" for relief it might appear
that the special inquiry officer was making a finding of fact based upon an evaluation of the record before him. If such a finding of facf were required by the statute,
the decision of the Attorney General would be subject to review in order to determine whether such findings were supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence .. . .However, Congress has made it abundantly clear by the express
wording of the statute that no such finding is contemplated or required. It left to the
broad discretion of the Attorney General the authority to suspend deportation in
such cases and the questions of both eligibility and merit .. .are part and parcel of
this administrative determination. The scope of our review, therefore, does not
permit this Court to substitute its opinion for that of the Attorney General.
Id. at 677 (footnotes omitted).
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able opportunity to present evidence on his own behalf.2 Thus, the
rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy3M

Second Circuit in United States ex.

wrote: "[A] court might intervene to stay deportation, if the Attorney General or his delegate should deny the alien any opportunity
to present evidence on the subject of persecution or should refuse to
3
consider the evidence presented by the alien." '
Some courts reviewed INS determinations for an "abuse of
discretion." 32 In Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 33 the court defined an abuse of discretion as a decision
"made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from
established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as an
invidious discrimination against a particular race or group,
or . . . on other 'considerations that Congress could not have intended to make relevant.' ' ' 34 The court's examination, however,
29. See Sovich v. Esperdy, 319 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1963); Kam Ng v. Pilliod, 279 F.2d
207, 210 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 860 (1961). See also Pereira-Diaz v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 551 F.2d 1149, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 1977); Daniel v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 528 F.2d 1278, 1280 (5th Cir. 1976); Cheng Kai Fu v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 386 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968).
30. 206 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1953).
31. Id. at 394-95 (footnote omitted).
32. E.g., Moghanian v. United States Dep't of Justice, 577 F.2d 141, 142 (9th Cir.
1978); Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281, 1289 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, vacated and
remanded, 434 U.S. 962 (1977); Pereira-Diaz v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 551
F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 1977); Daniel v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 528 F.2d
1278, 1280 (5th Cir. 1976); Shkukani v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 435 F.2d 1378,
1380 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 920 (1971); Muskardin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 415 F.2d 865, 866-67 (2d Cir. 1969); Hosseinmardi v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 405 F.2d 25, 27 (9th Cir.), reh'g denied, 405 F.2d 28 (1968). Cf. Hamad v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 420 F.2d 645, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (two tiered standard of review); Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 718
(2d Cir. 1966) (two tiered standard of review).
Professor Jaffe has defined the abuse of discretion standard of review:
Discretion . . . is the power of the administrator to make a choice from among two
or more legally valid solutions. Any solution presumptively is valid if it is an exercise
of a granted power and the exercise is motivated by considerations relevant to the
purposes of the statute ....
The courts have developed devices for controlling the
exercise of discretion. Perhaps they are all, in an extended sense, variants of the
concept of "abuse of discretion." Broadly stated an abuse of discretion is an exercise
of discretion in which a relevant consideration has been given an exaggerated, an
"unreasonable" weight at the expense of others ....
Discretion implies a "balancing"; where the result is eccentric, either there has not been a balancing, or a hidden
and mayhap improper motive has been at work ....
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIvE ACTION 586 (1965).
33. 360 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1966).
34. Wong Wing Hang, 360 F.2d at 719. See also Khalil v. District Director, 457 F.2d
1276, 1277 (9th Cir. 1972) (decision not based upon a reasonable foundation).
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was always conducted with great deference to the discretionary
3
authority of the INS under section 243(h) .
The narrow scope of review given administrative determinations under section 243(h) reflected a judicial attitude of noninterference. The courts viewed immigration law as an area within the
exclusive control of the executive and legislative branches of govern36
ment because of the foreign policy considerations attached to it.
The judiciary considered that the broad discretionary authority
given to the INS by Congress to administer the statute precluded
the courts from undertaking an extensive substantive review of INS
decisions. This position is illustrated in the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Kasravi v. Immigration & NaturalizationService. 37 Kasravi, an
Iranian citizen, contended that he would be subject to persecution
if returned to Iran because of his vocal opposition to the Shah
during his stay in the United States. 38 Kasravi sought relief under
3
section 243(h) .
The majority recognized that the claimant's position was
"strongly supported by two expert witnesses, each of whom [had]
impressive qualifications. ' 40 The court stated that the only evidence
submitted in opposition to the application for relief was a "perfunctory letter" written by a State Department official which concluded
that Iranian students in the United States would not "in all likeli-

35. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
36. This policy was expressed in Hariasides v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952),
wherein the Court wrote:
any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous
policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the
maintenance of a republican form of government. Such matters are so exclusively
entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from
judicial inquiry or interference.
Id. at 588-89 (footnote omitted). See also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976);
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-67 (1972).
37. 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968).
38. Id. at 676. In claiming that the administrative officer erred in deciding that he was
not eligible under the statute, Kasravi offered a "large volume of printed material" which,
according to the court, tended to show that the Iranian government suppressed undesirable
ideas and punished and tortured those who opposed the Shah, that Kasravi had vehemently
opposed the Shah during his stay in the United States, and that his criticism had been made
known to the Shah and to other Iranian officials. Id. Kasravi claimed that "by virtue of the
publicity he [had] received . . . if he [were] returned to Iran, he [would] be subject to
persecution, imprisonment and possibly death for his opposition to the Shah." Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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hood" be persecuted for their actions in the United States. 4' The
court questioned both the admissibility and the persuasiveness of
this letter. 42 Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit, perceiving its role as
limited by the discretion given the INS in making such determina44
tions, 43 affirmed the agency's decision.
Until the enactment of the Refugee Act, the clear probability
standard was the burden of proof required to be satisfied by all
applicants raising claims under section 243(h) of the Immigration
Act. The Protocol provided the basis for the changes ultimately
brought about by the Refugee Act.
II. THE UNITED NATIONS PROTOCOL RELATING
TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES
4
The United States became a party to the Protocol in 1968. 5
The Protocol adopted articles 2-34 inclusive of the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees' 0 (Convention) and extended
the Convention's protection to persons who became refugees as a
result of events occurring after January 1, 1951.47 The Convention set forth certain rights which all contracting nations were
required to accord refugees. 48 One such right was non-refoule-

41. Id. at 676-77.
42. Id. at 677. Concerning the letter's admissibility, the court noted:
Such letters from the State Department do not carry the guarantees of reliability
which the law demands of admissible evidence. A frank, but official, discussion of
the political shortcomings of a friendly nation is not always compatible with the
high duty to maintain advantageous diplomatic relations with nations throughout
the world. The traditional foundation required of expert testimony is lacking; nor
can official position be said to supply an acceptable substitute. No hearing officer or
court has the means to know the diplomatic necessities of the moment, in light of
which the statements must be weighed.
Id. at n.1.
43. Id. at 677-78.
44. Id. at 678.
45. Protocol, supra note 4.
46. Openedfor signature July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter cited as Convention].
47. Protocol, supra note 4 art. 1.
48. Notwithstanding isolated exceptions, these rights included nondiscrimination in
applying the provisions of the Convention with respect to race, religion and country of origin,
id. art. 3, and at least equal treatment with that of nationals of the contracting nations with
regard to freedom to practice religion, id. art. 4, protection of industrial property and of
rights in literary, artistic and scientific works, id. art. 14, freedom of association with nonpolitical and non-profit making associations and trade unions, id. art. 15, free access to
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ment, 4 "an obligation to refrain from forcibly returning a refugee
to a country where he is likely to suffer political persecution." 50 The
right of non-refoulement was contained in article 33 of the Protocol
which read: "No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler')
a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
51
or political opinion."

The applicability of article 33 is contingent upon a finding that
the claimant is in fact a refugee.5 2 Article 153 defines a refugee as a
person having a "well-founded fear" of persecution. 54 Therefore, a
claimant was required to demonstrate a well-founded fear of perse-

cution in order to qualify for protection under article 33.
It has been suggested that the well-founded fear standard
incorporates both objective and subjective elements.5 5 According to
one commentator supporting this position, "the circumstances and
background of the person, his psychological attitude and sensitivity

courts, id. art. 16, freedom to engage in wage earning employment, id. art. 17, freedom to
engage in self-employment, id. art. 18, freedom to practice the liberal professions, id. art. 19,
right to housing, id. art. 21, right to education, id. art. 22, labour legislation and social
security, id. art. 24. The Convention also secured refugees limited rights to administrative
assistance, id. art. 25, freedom of movement, id. art. 26, identity papers, id. art. 27, travel
documents, id. art. 28, freedom from discrimination in fiscal charges, id. art. 29, transfer of
assets, id. art. 30, freedom from expulsion, id. arts. 32, 33 and naturalization, id. art. 34.
49. Protocol, supra note 4, art. 33, § 1.
50. 2 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (1966).
51. Protocol, supra note 4, art. 33, § 1.
52. Article 33 prohibits contracting states to return or expel refugees to the frontiers of
territories where they would be subject to persecution. See supra note 51 and accompanying
text.
53. Protocol, supra note 4, art. 1. Article 1 states that a refugee is a person who: "owing
to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality
and is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country.
... Convention, supra note 46, art. 1, as revised by Protocol, supra note 4, art. 1.
54. The U.N. Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, involved in the drafting of the Convention, wrote that a well-founded fear exists where "a person has actually
been a victim of persecution or can show good reasons why he fears persecution." Report of
the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, 11 U.N. ESCOR Annex
(Agenda Item 32) at 39, U.N. Doc. E/1318 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee]. See also 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUcEEs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
181, 1966 (real chance of persecution).
55. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER ON REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURE AND

CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 11-12 (1979) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK];
Weis, supra note 21, at 970.
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towards his environment play a role as well as the objective
facts." 56 Grahl-Madsen, recognizing that the language of the Protocol requires that the fear be well-founded, applies an exclusively
objective standard . 7 He points out that "[w]e cannot find a meaningful common denominator in the minds of refugees. We must
seek it in the conditions prevailing in the country whence they have
58
fled."
The nature of the objective evidence required under the Protocol to establish eligibility is significantly different from that required under section 243(h). Section 243(h) mandated that to be
probative corroborating evidence must relate specifically to the
claimant.5 9 The Protocol's well-founded fear standard does not require that such evidence relate specifically to the applicant. One
German court, interpreting the standard to be applied under the
Protocol, found that a well-founded fear exists "'when a reasonable
person would draw the conclusion from external facts that he
would be subject to persecution in his home country."' 60 Although
an applicant seeking relief must show good reason to fear persecution,61 his claim under the Protocol would be supported by episodes
of past persecution, 2 evidence that other persons in similar circumstances to those of the applicant have been persecuted,6 3 and evidence of intervening events creating a risk of persecution during the
applicant's absence. 6 4 Hence, a reasonable fear of persecution may
"relate to any set of circumstances which may serve as an indication
of the likelihood of future persecution." 65

56. Weis, supra note 21, at 970.
57. See 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 54, at 174-76.
58. Id. at 175.
59. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
60. 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 54, at 174 (quoting Judgment of Mar. 25, 1959,
No. 3719, VerwG Ansbach, W. Ger., [1958] 2 Entscheidungen des Verwaltungsgerichts, a
decision by the Bavarian administrative court of first instance in the former American zone).
61. HANDBOOK, supra note 55, at 11; Report of the Ad Hoe Committee, supra note 54,
at 39.
62. "[I]f a person has experienced persecution, that maybe considered primafacie proof
to the effect that he may again become a victim of persecution should he return to his home
country, so long as the regime which persecuted him prevails in that country." 1 A. GCAHLMADSEN, supra note 54, at 176. See also Report of the Ad Hoe Committee, supra note 54, at
39 (well-founded fear exists when a person has actually been a victim of persecution).
63. 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 54, at 179.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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Furthermore, evidentiary analysis in proceedings under article
33 was intended to take into account the generally acknowledged
problems of the person claiming refugee status in obtaining corroborating evidence."" Weis, in discussing the evidence necessary to
establish a successful claim states:
The normal rules of evidence are, however, difficult to apply in
proceedings for the determination of refugee status. The applicant may call witnesses in support of his statement and he may
sometimes be able to present documentary evidence. But it follows from the very situation in which he finds himself as an
exile, that he will rarely be in a position to submit conclusive
evidence. It will essentially be a question whether his submis67
sions are credible and, in the circumstances, plausible.

This approach does not emphasize corroborating evidence but
examines such things as the consistency of the claimant's own testimony. Thus, the evidence considered probative under the Protocol
will be broadened to include the claimant's own testimony, provided his submissions are "credible" and "plausible." In contrast,
section 243(h) dismissed the claimant's unsubstantiated testimony
as not probative.68
III. DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN ARTICLE 33
OF THE PROTOCOL AND SECTION 243(h)
OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT
In Dunar,o9 the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) ruled
that article 33 of the Protocol had "effected no substantial changes
in the application of section 243(h), either by way of burden of

66. Grahl-Madsen states:
[I]t is a well-known fact that a person who claims to be a refugee may have
difficulties in proving his allegations. He may have left his country without any
papers, there may be nobody around who may testify to support his story, and other
means of corroboration may be unavailable.
1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 54, at 145-46. See also HANDBOOK, supra note 55, at 47
(refugees are often limited in the evidence they can submit to support their claims); Weis,
The InternationalProtectionof Refugees, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 193-94 (1954) (problems
plaguing refugees).
67. Weis, supra note 21, at 986.
68. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
69. 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (1973). In Dunar, the Board considered the claim of a native
and citizen of Hungary who was admitted to the United States on January 10, 1966 as an
immigrant visitor and remained longer than permitted. Id. The claimant conceded deport-
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proof, coverage, or manner of arriving at decisions." 70 The Board
applied certain "well-settled" principles generally used to determine whether a treaty 7 has modified or repealed a prior Congressional enactment. It stated that the "purpose of a treaty to supersede an act of Congress, in whole or in part, may not be lightly
assumed. . . . Such a purpose must appear clearly and distinctly
from the words used in the treaty. ' 72 The Board wrote that where a
treaty and a statute relate to the same subject, an attempt must be
made to give effect to both without violating the language of either.73 If the treaty and the statute are irreconcilable, the treaty
will control if it is of later date7 4 and its provisions are self-executing. 75 The Board then examined the legislative history of the Proto-

abflity and requested withholding of deportation to Hungary under § 243(h). At a later
hearing counsel withdrew the concession of deportability and contended that, as a refugee
who had legally entered the United States as a nonimmigrant, the claimant was immune
from deportation under article 32 of the Protocol. Id. at 311. However, the Board found the
claimant deportable and found no inconsistency between article 32 and the existing immigration law. Id. at 311-18. Because the respondent was deportable, the Board was required to
consider his eligibility for relief under § 243(h) of the Immigration Act. Id. at 318. In doing so
the Board considered the effect of article 33 of the Protocol on § 243(h).
70. Id. at 323. No court had resolved the issue of the arguable discrepancies between the
Protocol and § 243(h) of the Immigration Act before the Dunar decision. In Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62 (1969), the Supreme Court noted that it was
"premature to consider whether, and under what circumstances, an order of deportation
might contravene the Protocol and Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees". Id. 80
n.22.
In decisions rendered after Dunar, the courts acquiesced in the board's conclusions
concerning the inconsistencies between the Protocol and the Immigration Act. See Kashani v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 547 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1977); Ming v. Marks, 367 F.
Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 505 F.2d 1170 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 911 (1975). But see Coriolan v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 559 F.2d 993,
996 (5th Cir. 1977) (Attorney General's broad discretion to withhold deportation under §
243(h) must be "measured in light of" the Protocol).
71. Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. at 313. The Board regarded the Protocol as a treaty because
it supplemented and incorporated the substantive principles of the convention. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. "Where fairly possible, a United States statute should be construed so as not to
bring it into conflict with international law or an international agreement of the United
States." RESTATEMENT (REVIsED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 134
(Tent. Draft No. 1 (1980). See also Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 321 (1907).
74. Id. "A rule of international law or a provision of an agreement that becomes
effective as law in the United States supersedes any inconsistent . . . preexisting provision in
the law of the United States." RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 135 (Tent. Draft No. 1 1980).
75. The Restatement states the following concerning this concept:
[T]he intention of the United States determines whether an agreement is to be self-
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col and concluded that Congress had not intended that the treaty
change existing immigration law.7 To the contrary,
the general representations made to induce affirmative Senate
action indicated that our immigration laws already embodied
the humane provisions for refugees fostered by the Convention
and Protocol. Accession by the United States, it was asserted,
would lend the weight of our moral support to the measure and
would influence other nations with less liberal refugee legisla77
tion to adhere to it.

To justify its conclusion that the Immigration Act and the Protocol
were not in conflict, the Board relied on Congress' lack of manifest
intention to repeal section 243(h).7 8
The Board's analysis of the differing legal standards under the
statute and the treaty focused on the distinction between "subjective" and "objective" fear of persecution. 7 The claimant had contended that under the Protocol's well-founded fear standard, the
claimant's own state of mind was the primary test. 80 The Board
reasoned that the Protocol's "requirement that the fear be 'wellfounded' rules out an apprehension which is purely subjective. A
fear which is illusory, neurotic or paranoid, however sincere, does
not meet this requirement.""' The Board noted that "some sort of a
showing must be made and this can ordinarily be done only by
executing in the United States or should await implementing legislation. If the
international agreement is silent as to its self-executing character and the intention
of the United States is unclear, account must be taken of any statement by the
President in concluding the agreement or in submitting it to the Senate for consent
or to the Congress as a whole for approval, and of any expression by the Senate or by
Congress in dealing with the agreement.
Id. § 131 comment h.
The legislative history of the Protocol in the Senate indicates that the United States
believed that accession to the Protocol would not "impinge adversely upon established
practices under existing laws in the United States" S. Ex~c. K. 90th Cong., 2d Sess. III (1980)
(letter of transmittal), and that in fact, the United States "already ... [met] the standards of
the Protocol .... S. ExEc. RE'. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1980) (statement of
Leonard Dawson). Such statements would seem to indicate that the United States believed
that no implementing legislation was necessary in order that the Protocol take effect. Since in
that sense the Protocol was not intended to await "implementing legislation," it was arguably
self-executing.
76. Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. at 314.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 314-15.
79. Id. at 319.
80. Id.
81. Id.

1982]

WITHHOLDING DEPORTATION

objective evidence." On that basis, the Board concluded that the
clear probability standard required the same evidentiary showing
as did the Protocol's well-founded fear standard. 82 The Board's
conclusion was incorrect because it failed to extend its analysis to an
examination of the objective showing required to establish eligibility under the well-founded fear standard and by the clear probability standard. The significant conflict between the two standards
was in the different types of objective evidence accepted as probative. 83 This fundamental distinction brought into irreconcilable
conflict the legal standards to be satisfied in establishing eligibility
under the Protocol and under the immigration laws.
The conflict between the discretionary nature of the immigration law and the mandatory nature of the Protocol was exacerbated
by the Board's statement that "we know of [no case] in which a
finding has been made that the alien has established a clear probability that he will be persecuted and in which section 243(h) withholding has nevertheless been denied in the exercise of administra-

tive discretion. "84
The Board did not consider the implications arising from the
fact that section 243(h) was discretionary. The rationale for the
court's extremely limited role in reviewing 243(h) determinations
had been the discretionary nature of that section and the vesting of
that discretion in the INS by Congress.8 5 A provision which entitles
the applicant to relief upon a sufficient showing of eligibility, such
as article 33 of the Protocol, limits this discretion. Such a mandatory provision creates a right to relief and would provide grounds
for the courts to increase their role in reviewing such claims to
ensure that the standards of law governing the conferral of relief
are consistent with the requirements of the Protocol. This was not
realized until Congress enacted the Refugee Act. The decisions of
the Courts of Appeals rendered under the mandatory provision of
the Refugee Act reflect the judiciary's independence in withholding
of deportation cases. 88
82. Id.
83. See supra notes 20-25, 55-68 and accompanying text.
84. Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. at 322. See also 1A C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND lNocFnuR 5-176 to 177 (rev. ed. 1982) (although § 243(h) contemplated the
exercise of discretion, it is doubtful that such discretion included the authority to deport an
alien in the face of demonstrated persecution).
85. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 89-112 and accompanying text.
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IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 203(e)
OF THE REFUGEE ACT

Inenacting the Refugee Act, Congress intended to conform the

provisions of the immigration law previously embodied in section
243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to the Protocol.8 7
Section 203(e) of the Refugee Act reads: "The Attorney General
shall not deport or return any alien . . .to a country if the Attorney
General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."8 8
The Ninth Circuit 89 and the Second Circuit 0 have rendered
decisions construing the amended section. Both courts have ruled
that the statute not only mandates that withholding of deportation
be granted once statutory eligibility has been successfully established, but also limits the agency's discretion in making the determination of statutory eligibility and increases the role of the judiciary
in reviewing INS decisions. Congress and the courts, by making and

87. The legislative history of § 203(e) of the Refugee Act, the successor to previous §
243(h), indicates that § 203(e) is "based directly upon the language ... [of article 33] of the
Protocol and it is intended that the provision be construed consistent with the Protocol." S.
REP. No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 20 (1980). See also H. R. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 20, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONc. & AD. NEws 160, 161.
88. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. IV 1980). Under the Refugee Act, the definition of
refugee also has been made to conform to that contained in article 1 of the Protocol.
According to the legislative history of the Refugee Act, § 2 01(a) incorporates the "internationally accepted definition of refugee contained in the Convention and Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees." S. REP. No. 590, 96th Cong.,,2d Sess. 19 (1980). See also H. R. REP. No.

781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980); STAFF OF THE SENATE COMMIIrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess., REviEw OF U.S. RESEsrLEMENT POLICY, app. II, at 83 (Comm. Print 1980).

Section 201(a) as codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(42) (Supp. IV 1980), reads:
The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country of such
person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in which such person last habitually resided and who is unable or unwilling
to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection
of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion ....
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (42) (Supp. IV 1980).
Since the legislative history of the Refugee Act indicates that § 203(e) is to be construed
consistently with the Protocol, the "well-founded fear" referred to in section 201(a) should be
adopted as the new legal standard governing eligibility under the Refugee Act. Moreover, this
standard should be construed as it has been under the Protocol. The Ninth Circuit has
impliedly done so. See infra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
89. McMullen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981).
90. Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982).
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interpreting these changes, have effectively incorporated the principle of non-refoulement as embodied in article 33 of the Protocol
into United States immigration law.
A. McMullen v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
In McMullen v. Immigration & Naturalization Service9 ' the
Ninth Circuit interpreted the Refugee Act as changing the administration of section 243(h). The first change mandated by the new
legislation, according to the court, was an increase in the opportunity for judicial review. The Ninth Circuit wrote that the "role of
the reviewing court necessarily changes when the charge to the
92
agency changes from one of discretion to an imperative." The
court reasoned that because section 203(e) of the Refugee Act removed the absolute discretion previously vested in the INS, a formal finding of fact was required; deportation must, therefore, be
withheld if certain facts are found to exist. 93 The court reasoned
that because "[a]gency findings arising from public, record-producing proceedings are normally subject to the substantial-evidence
standard of review,"9' 4 the same test would now be applied in
reviewing claims of refugee status to which the Refugee Act applied.

91. 685 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981). McMullen was an appeal from the Board's denial of
a claim made under § 203(e) of the Refugee Act for withholding of deportation. McMullen,
17 I. & N. Dec. 542 (1980). The claimant, McMullen, was a former member of the
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) who claimed that he would be persecuted if
deported to his home country of Northern Ireland. Id. at 543. In addition to claiming that he
would be persecuted by the Irish government because of his past association with the PIRA,
McMullen asserted that he would be subject to persecution by the PIRA because of his refusal
to participate any longer in their terrorist activities. Id.
Although a 243(h) claim normally contemplates persecution by the applicant's home
government, such a claim can be made if the applicant proves that he will be persecuted by
an organization that the government is unable or unwilling to control. The elements of proof
of such a claim are equivalent to those in a case where the government is the persecutor. Id.
at 544-45.
The INS brought deportation proceedings against McMullen on the grounds that he had
entered the country illegally. Id. at 543. Conceding his deportability, McMullen claimed
relief under § 203(e) of the Refugee Act. Id. at 543-44. The Board denied McMullen's claim,
employing the clear probability standard. Id. at 544.
92. McMullen, 658 F.2d at 1316.
93. Id.
94. Id. The substantial evidence standard of review has been defined by the Supreme
Court as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); Consolo v.
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The precise difference between the substantial evidence standard and the abuse of discretion standard mandated by the Immigration law is unclear.9 5 In McMullen, however, the change in standards of review clearly reflects a changed attitude on the part of the
court concerning its perceived role in reviewing administrative determinations. Whereas the courts had previously been extremely
reluctant to review substantive evidence,96 the Ninth Circuit conducted an extensive review of the evidence presented by both sides

Federal Maritime Comm'n., 383 U.S. 607, 619-20 (1966). See also Universal Camera Corp.
v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951); Labor Board v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co.,
306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939).
Professor Davis points out that this standard does not allow the court to usurp the factfinding function of the administrative agency. He indicates that fact finding may often
involve the inference of basic facts from the testimony or demeanor of witnesses or of an
ultimate fact from undisputed basic facts or from conflicting evidence. 4 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TPRATISE § 29.05 at 137 (1958). The weight to be given
to these facts and
inferences to be drawn from them are not subject to judicial review. Rather the question for
the reviewing court is whether the conclusions reached at the administrative level may be
reasonably based on the facts so proven. Id. at 139. Thus, "[t]he court may not substitute its
judgment on the question whether the inference drawn is the right one or whether a different
inference would be better supported. The test is reasonableness, not rightness." Id.
95. In Charlton v. United States, 412 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1969), the court expressed the
following view of the distinction between the abuse of discretion standard and the substantial
evidence test:
While agency action which is arbitrary and capricious, or which constitutes an
abuse of discretion, would no doubt be action which is "unsupported by substantial
evidence," the reverse is not true. In other words, even where the agency action is
not arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion, there may still not be
"substantial evidence" in the accepted use of that test to justify
the agency action.
Id. at 398 (Stahl, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). On the other hand, one court viewed
the distinction between the two as "semantic in some degree." Associated Indus. v. United
States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349-50 (2d Cir. 1973).
One commentator argues in another context that the two standards are the same where
the grounds for challenging the agency action is the inadequacy of the evidentiary basis:
[T]he two concepts are [not], in all contexts, coextensive, for often an assertion of
arbitrariness or abuse of discretion is not based upon an alleged lack of evidentiary
support for the determination. A decision may be "arbitrary," for example, if it rests
in part upon unlawful considerations, or deviates unaccountably from previous
agency decisions. But in the limited class of cases in which the ground for challenging the agency action is the inadequacy of its evidentiary basis, it is difficult to
imagine a decision having no substantial evidence to support it which is not "arbitrary," or a decision struck down as arbitrary which is in fact supported by "substantial evidence." In short, in an evidentiary context the level of required support
seems about the same whether the "substantial evidence" or the "arbitrary" test is
used.
Scalia & Goodman, ProceduralAspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 899, 935 n.138 (1973).
96. See supra notes 28-44 and accompanying text.
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in this case and made an independent judgment concerning the
reasonableness of the agency's conclusions.
In conducting its review, the Ninth Circuit was willing to
accept as probative evidence which was given little weight in proceedings under section 243(h) of the Immigration Act. Instead of
assuming the unreliability of the claimant's own testimony,9 7 the
majority was willing to look at the nature of such testimony.9 8 In
this case the court determined that the "considerable length [of
McMullen's testimony]; its reference to specific dates, places, incidents, details, and motivations; and its consistency under crossexamination . . [indicate] that McMullen is either an elaborate
and skilled liar, or that he was telling the truth."99 1 The court's
willingness to find the claimant's own testimony relevant to the
issue of his being subject to persecution, provided that such testimony be consistent and believable, is a tacit rejection of the clear
probability standard, under which all evidence must be corroborated. Instead, the Ninth Circuit adopted the well-founded fear
standard under which such testimony is probative. Furthermore,
the court did not require that McMullen produce evidence specifically relating to himself to meet this burden of proof, as had been
previously required. 0 0 In considering the documentary evidence
submitted, the majority wrote that "[e]vidence of a pattern of
uncontrolled PIRA persecution . . . is relevant in determining
whether McMullen is likely to face persecution upon deporta1 Once
tion." 10
again the court seems to adopt the well-founded fear
standard's requirement that to be probative, corroborating evi-

97. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
98. The Immigration and Naturalization Service had argued that McMullen's testimony
was inherently unbelievable "not because it [was] internally inconsistent or lacking in the ring
of truth-but because a [claimant] in a deportation case is motivated to lie in support of his
own case." McMullen, 658 F.2d at 1318.
99. Id.
100. In support of his claim, McMullen offered
documents .. .of a general nature, describing such things as Irish history and the
workings of the IRA and PIRA. Descriptions of numerous killings and violent
incidents relating to the Irish conflict are given. There are also Amnesty International reports .... The vast majority of the documents relate either to conditions
in Ireland and Northern Ireland generally, or to persons other than the respondent.
McMullen, 17 I. & N. Dec. 542, 545-46 (1980). The Board had found that such evidence was
not probative on the issue of this alien being subject to persecution if deported to Ireland. Id.
at 546.
101. McMullen, 658 F.2d at 1318.
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dence need only relate to circumstances which indicate a likelihood
of persecution.
Finally, the court acknowledged the difficulties faced by a
person "in McMullen's position" in presenting proof of anticipated
persecution. The majority indicated that these difficulties would be
taken into account in setting the legal standard to be employed
under the Refugee Act.102 Thus, without specifically mentioning
the Protocol's well-founded fear standard, the Ninth Circuit has
effectively incorporated significant elements of this standard into
the immigration law.
B. Stevic v. Sava
The Second Circuit has also interpreted the Refugee Act to
require certain changes in the administration of withholding of
deportation claims. Stevic v. Sava was an appeal from a denial of a
motion to reopen deportation proceedings by a citizen of Yugoslavia
who claimed entitlement to relief under section 203(e) of the Refugee Act. 0 3 In its decision, the Second Circuit discussed the changes
effected by the new legislation.
The court recognized that Congress, in enacting the Refugee
Act, had intended to make a "comprehensive revision of immigration laws relating to asylum."10 4 Concerning section 203(e) of that
Act, the court concluded, based upon the legislative history and
plain meaning of the section, that it should be construed consistently with the language and spirit of the Protocol. 105

The majority stated, as the Ninth Circuit had in McMullen,
that because section 203(e) of the Refugee Act made mandatory
what was previously discretionary, certain changes were required
102. Id. at 1319. The court wrote:
If McMullen, a well known former PIRA member with an extensively documented
claim of probable persecution, failed to present sufficient proof, then it appears
close to impossible for anyone in McMullen's position to make out a § 243(h) case.
Cf. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook on Procedure and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, 196, p. 47 (1979) (noting that refugees
fleeing political persecution are often limited in the evidence they can submit to
support their claims).

Id.
103. Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982). Stevic was a consolidated action in
which an appeal from a dismissal of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was also at issue.
Id. at 402.
104. Id. at 407.
105. Id. at 408.
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in the administration of previous section 243(h).10 6 The court stated
that the clear probability test was the method by which the INS
implemented what had been its discretion under section 243(h).107
It reasoned that "[s]ince Article 33 of the Convention imposes an
absolute obligation upon the United States, standards developed in
an era of discretionary authority require some adjustment." 108 The
majority recognized that as a result of the change from discretion to
obligation, the judiciary was called upon to exercise independent
judgment concerning the meaning of the Protocol 0 9 and an obligation was imposed upon the courts to ensure that the "non-discretionary exercise of Section 243(h) authority has been performed
according to the correct standards of law."' 1
The court concluded that it had an obligation to determine the
correct standard of proof to be used in withholding of deportation
proceedings under amended section 203(e).II After considering the
standard of proof contemplated by the drafters of the Protocol, the
court held that under the new legislation, "deportation must be
withheld, upon a showing far short of a 'clear probability' that an
individual will be singled out for persecution." 11 2
CONCLUSION
In exercising a newly acquired power to review INS determinations made under section 243(h) of the immigration law as
amended, the courts have taken a significant step toward reconcil-

106. Id. at 406.
107. Id. See Joseph, 13 I. & N. Dec. 70, 72 (1968); Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564, 566
(1967).
108. Stevic, 678 F.2d at 406.
109. Id. at 409.
110. Id. at 410. The court further stated: "While we do not sit to second-guess the
merits of the decisions reached under section 243(h), our obligation to assure observance of
correct legal standards under this mandatory provision is to be contrasted with the more
limited role of courts in reviewing [Board] decisions under grants of discretionary authority.
...Id.
111. Id. at 408-09.
112. Id. at 409. Regarding the specific nature of the standard to be applied under the
Refugee Act, the court wrote:
It would be unwise to attempt a more detailed elaboration of the applicable legal
test under the Protocol. It emphasizes the fear of the applicant as well as the
reasonableness of that fear. Its further development must await concrete factual
situations as they arise. That development can be informed by the traditional
indices of legislative intent, by the Handbook and by experience.
Id. at 410.
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ing the legal standards required to establish eligibility for withholding of deportation under article 33 of the Protocol with the immigration laws of the United States. The Second Circuit in Stevic
rejected the clear probability standard. The Ninth Circuit in McMullen has gone farther, impliedly adopting the Protocol's "wellfounded fear standard."
The courts should continue their active role in assuring that
correct legal standards are observed in this area by expressly adopting the well-founded standard as embodied in the Protocol. Adoption of this standard is necessary because of the obligations of the
United States under the Protocol. Adoption would also accord with
the express intent of Congress in enacting the Refugee Act. Finally,
the express adoption of the well-founded fear standard would provide needed clarification of the law of withholding of deportation.
Edward A. Smith III

